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Introduction
Street sexual harassment is the unwelcome commodit-
ization of women’s bodies by fellow citizen-strangers.
Street sexual harassment can be defined as unwanted
comments, gestures, and actions made in a public
place related to the innocent party’s perceived sex,
gender, gender expression, or sexual orientation (Stop
Street Harassment 2015) . This includes actions such
as whistling, leering, sexist slurs, persistent requests for
a name or number, following, flashing, and public
masturbation (Stop Street Harassment 2015) . Histor-
ically, this behaviour has been described using the un-
gendered and non-descript term of “catcalling.” The
insults—or “compliments” as they may be mischarac-
terized by perpetrators—can be frequent but unpre-
dictable. This consistent but randomized violence
creates sizeable harm by making public space uncom-
fortable, even unsafe, for women. Dread of this im-
pending violation of dignity is a state of oppression
for many women.
This harm is under-recognized by traditional, Anglo-
centric common law. The #MeToo wave of the femin-
ist movement has brought a renewed interest in, and
public discourse about, the oppression that mainly
women face, usually at the hands ofmen. Personal ex-
periences—so prominent in the #MeToo wave—are
often absent in legal discourse and, to some extent,
academic research generally. The feminist movement,
in contrast, relies on the power of storytelling and
consciousness-raising to counteract the dominant
male viewpoint. This paper explores the ways that the
#MeToo wave of feminism has raised awareness of
sexual harassment, how this might bring attention to
street sexual harassment in Canada, and the potential
legal remedies available.
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This paper begins by discussing the #MeToo wave, in
particular by suggesting that it is a re-branded version
of the feminist movement that is helpful but not suf-
ficient to address street sexual harassment. Second,
the paper outlines how street sexual harassment
harms women. Third, some contextual analysis of
why governments and legal systems have been slow
to address street sexual harassment is provided.
Fourth, the paper assesses the various areas of the law
that may be used to curb street sexual harassment.
Finally, this paper canvasses the ways other govern-
ments have taken action against street sexual harass-
ment.
Ultimately, this paper argues that the lack of protec-
tion of the basic civil right to use the public sphere
free of sexual harassment is a failure of the Canadian
justice system, and a criminal response remains es-
sential. Other methods of legal regulation are inad-
equate without the social condemnation that
criminal law carries.
The #MeToo Context
I contend that the true value of #MeToo is not in its
expression as a new “movement.” Rather, #MeToo
fits within the greater feminist movement, and is not
a separate movement unto itself. This article there-
fore labels the movement as a “wave” within the fem-
inist movement, an approach endorsed by others
(Parry 2018) .
The #MeToo wave of feminism is a modern and di-
gitally-flourishing take on a traditional pillar of the
women’s movement: consciousness-raising. Women
sharing their oft-similar stories of gender-based viol-
ence creates a unifying experience out of what can
seem to be an individual or even invisible problem.
The #MeToo wave has created a more open social
climate for discussing gender-based violence, includ-
ing street sexual harassment.
Many #MeToo stories seem to include—and re-
sponses to these stories gain oxygen from—the abuse
of power. This is evident in the #MeToo focus on
Weinstein-style harassment, i.e. abuse within a rela-
tionship of unequal power. However, this focus poses
a challenge to addressing issues of street sexual harass-
ment, or sexual assault more generally, where the issue
is not about an individual asserting and abusing their
power over a more vulnerable colleague or date. Acts
of street sexual harassment are more randomized and
anonymous. Perhaps because a single incident of
street sexual harassment is less destructive or violent
than a rape, it is wrongly deemed innocuous. The
more universal an experience in men’s lives, the more
often society rationalizes street sexual harassment as a
harmless experience (e.g., “boys will be boys,” “locker
room talk,” and various other anachronisms for
broad-based and socially acceptable gender violence) .
This ignores how a hundred incidents of harassment
invade the psychological safety and self-worth of wo-
men.
The genesis of #MeToo mainly regarded the struggles
of privileged, white, cis, wealthy, and often celebrit-
ized women, the root theme of this wave of the fem-
inist movement. The lessons, however, can and should
be broader. Intersectional analysis acknowledges that
multiple spheres of structural disadvantage exist but
cannot be understood by simply adding layers of dis-
advantage. Race, gender expression, and all the factors
that signal non-conformity to the patriarchy’s ideal-
ized woman can affect the way she is harassed and the
harms she experiences. Notions of attractiveness are
socialized, including social preference by race, eco-
nomic status, gender expression, and physical ability.
The harm from street sexual harassment varies based
on social preference and status. Street sexual harass-
ment is not reserved for women who are deemed so-
cially desirable, and can also be used as a tool to
police and demean women perceived as undesirable or
nonconformist. Thus, while the #MeToo wave of
feminism has provided an important shift toward
personal and widely shared stories, an intersectional
feminist lens is also necessary to address street sexual
harassment.
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The Harm
Many women can still recall their first personal ex-
perience with street sexual harassment because it was
traumatizing (Trudy 2013; Vinciguerra 1994) .
Norma Anne Oshynko wrote in her Master of Law
thesis that “street harassment can best be understood
as an integral part of a system of sexual terrorism
which allows men to dominate and control women”
(Oshynko 2002) .
Street sexual harassment tells women that our pres-
ence in the public sphere is open for comment and
criticism by strangers. The attacks remind women
that our bodies are commodities to be freely con-
sumed and commented upon by fellow citizens. Sev-
eral scholars have argued that street sexual
harassment—and the lack of legal recourse available
to survivors of it—is an ongoing denial to grant wo-
men their basic human rights. Gender scholar
Robert Allen wrote:
Whether in the workplace or on the street, the
purpose of sexual harassment is to reduce wo-
men to objects sexually vulnerable to men, and
to reestablish the traditional power relation-
ship between men and women. Indeed, wo-
men’s sexual vulnerability to men is a key locus
of male power, something men learn to expect.
(1995, 134)
As Cynthia Grant Bowman wrote in herHarvardLaw
Review article, street harassment is the denial of a ba-
sic civil liberty:
The most fundamental definitions of liberty
include the right of an individual to go where
she chooses in spaces that are public. Indeed,
liberty of this sort is essential to equal particip-
ation in the affairs of the polis. The security to
move about in public, what Blackstone called
“the power of locomotion,” is one of the most
basic civil rights; it is essential to the rights to
assemble and petition for redress of griev-
ances—the primary prerequisites to participa-
tion in public affairs and admission to the
public realm. Thus, when the law fails to pro-
tect women from street harassment, it deprives
them of one of the basic goods for which gov-
ernment was ordained, leaving them in an
Hobbesian wilderness men do not share. (1993,
520-21 )
Image 1: A sample ofonline posts sharing thoughts about and personal experiences ofstreet sexual harassment. (Clockwise from top left:
Collazo 2013; unknown; Laxer 2013; Alston 2012; Moore 2015; Boosil 2015; CompleteStreetsCat 2015)
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More specifically, the many harms of street sexual
harassment include feeling powerless, dehumanized,
and isolated; fearing for one’s safety; and the practical
effects of changing one’s daily habits, including going
outside less and at more restricted times (Davis 2017;
Fox 2016) . No recitation of the harm flowing from
street sexual harassment would be complete without
noting the role that sexual harassment plays in con-
doning gender-based violence. Widespread objecti-
fication of women’s bodies is linked to violence
against women (American Psychological Association
2007; Oddone-Paolucci, Genuis and Violato 2000) .
Recognizing these harms is important because dam-
ages are a key element under the law, but also because
such recognition helps to stamp out the myth that
some women enjoy street sexual harassment. As with
other forms of sexual violence, myths exist to rein-
force the acceptability of the violating conduct. That
“catcalls” are inoffensive and even flattering is one
such myth. New York Post writer Doree Lewak con-
troversially wrote of street harassment as a “drive-by
dose of confidence [that] is the 10-second antidote to
all that negative feedback in the real world” (2014) .
Although some women may claim that they enjoy the
experience, this does not address the lack of consent
to such harassment by all women.
The Statistics
The nature of street sexual harassment makes it diffi-
cult to track; it is constant yet unpredictable. Often,
the woman is alone and the only witnesses are friends
of the offender. Often, the harassment comes from a
moving vehicle.
Hollaback! and Cornell University began a large-scale
research survey on street harassment in 2014. There
were over 16,600 respondents overall, making this
survey the largest analysis of street harassment to date.
The study found that, globally, the majority of wo-
men experience their first incident of street harass-
ment during puberty (Livingston 2014) .
In Canada, 620 women participated in the survey:
73% reported their first experience with street harass-
ment between the ages of 10 and 17, and 79% ofwo-
men reported being followed by a man or group of
men that made them feel unsafe during the past year
(Livingston 2014) . Over 60% of women reported
changing their daily lives to avoid harassment, for ex-
ample by taking different modes of transportation or a
different route home, not going out at night, not so-
cializing, feeling distracted at school and work, and
changing the time of leaving an event or location
(Livingston 2014) . A 2013 Hollaback! Ottawa com-
munity consultation on street sexual harassment
found that 97% of respondents had experienced har-
assment on the street in the past year (Hollaback! Ot-
tawa 2013) .
Image 2: Tom Fonder 2014
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Relevant Academic Theories
A primary reason for the lack of government priority
given to street sexual harassment is its disproportion-
ate effect on women. As briefly discussed below,
dominance feminism best explains the lived experi-
ences of women subjected to street sexual harass-
ment. Critical legal studies (CLS) also helps explain
why women are refused full and equal access to legal
protections and why the law systematically under-
serves less powerful communities.
Dominance feminism emphasizes the difference in
power between men and women and how men’s in-
terests dominate the agenda in a patriarchal society
(Chamallas 2012) . Women’s lack of power means a
lack of voice in state priorities and governance
(MacKinnon 1983) . Street sexual harassment does
not often attack male dignity. The status quo allows
men to engage in street sexual harassment at their
whim. Thus, the current system of what is deemed
acceptable street sexual harassment shoulders women
with the majority of the harm. Dominance feminism
explains why street sexual harassment is not men-
tioned in the House of Commons or newspapers
(Baumgardner and Richards 2000) . Such awareness
would require the legislature and media to step out
of the dominant male perspective.
Critical legal studies has value in dissecting discrim-
ination within the law. CLS deconstructs the way
that power embeds and recreates itself within the
legal system, never devolving to the vulnerable. Crit-
ical legal theory posits that:
Legal thought originates, of course, within the
consciousness of the dominant class because it
is in this class’ interest to bring it into being,
but it is accepted and interiorized by everyone
because of the traumatic absence of connec-
tedness that would otherwise erupt into
awareness. (Gabel 1992)
Feminist legal theorists would point out that the
dominant class is overwhelmingly male.
Relevant Canadian Law
Sexual harassment has been recognized as an offence
under the anti-sex discrimination provisions in the
human rights codes present across Canada’s provinces
(Janzen v. Platy 1989) . Freedom from sexual harass-
ment is thus a human right in part because sexual
harassment is an affront to dignity, personal integrity,
autonomy, and personhood (Allen 1995; British
Columbia Law Institute 2001 ) .
Chief Justice Dickson for the Supreme Court stated in
1989 that sexual harassment is “an abuse of both eco-
nomic and social power” (Janzen v. Platy 1989) .
Courts have recognized that sexual harassment in-
cludes leering (Webb v. Cyprus Pizza 1985) , sexually
suggestive gestures (Sharp v. Seasons Restaurant
Ontario 1987), and derogatory or degrading remarks.
These legal cases involved workplace sexual harass-
ment, however, not street sexual harassment.
In considering street sexual harassment, one funda-
mental question is whether the legal response should
be a matter of private or public law, as both could play
a role. Broadly speaking, public law is an umbrella
term to describe the areas of law that affect society as a
whole, and private law regards disputes between indi-
viduals and commercial entities. After reviewing ele-
ments of private law, this paper argues that,
ultimately, the social condemnation aspect of public
law, in particular, the Criminal Code established by
the federal government, makes it a more useful avenue
to begin addressing street sexual harassment. The
Criminal Code is taught to law students as the set of
rules the government uses to indicate what behaviour
the state condemns and will punish through a reduc-
tion in civil liberties.
i. Private Law
Feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon (1987) wrote:
“Sexual harassment, the event, is not new to women.
It is the law of injuries that it is new to” (3) . In a 1992
Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) conference pa-
per, lawyers stated a similar idea: “There is no inher-
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ent barrier preventing resourceful counsel from con-
ceiving a cause of action arising from circumstances
wherein a client has been the victim of sexual harass-
ment” (LSUC 1992, D-2) . This progressive stance
would prove naive. Sexual harassment by way of sex
discrimination has been a proven tort (Lajoie v. Kelly
1997), but courts have been reticent to recognize it
in other instances (Seneca College v. Bhadauria
1981 ) . The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench said
that whether the court recognized a tort of sexual
harassment “is still an open question” (Campbell-
Fowler v. Royal Trust Co. 1993) . Gillian Demeyere
provides a helpful summary of sexual harassment
torts to date:
While courts have uniformly allowed actions
for breach of contract based on alleged sexual
harassment to proceed, the treatment of ac-
tions in tort has been less consistent. Some
courts have declined to exercise their jurisdic-
tion over claims asserting independently re-
cognized torts where the conduct alleged
might be also described as sexual harass-
ment.. . .
There can be little dispute that the wrong of
sexual harassment can include the violation of
interests long protected by the common law.
Indeed, the pleadings approach concedes as
much, by finding actions that plead independ-
ently recognized causes of action to be within
the jurisdiction of common law courts. But by
holding actions that plead merely “sexual har-
assment” to be beyond the jurisdiction of the
common law, the pleadings approach impli-
citly declares that the wrongfulness of sexual
harassment consists wholly in the fact that it is
a form of sex discrimination. So understood,
the common law cannot come to recognize a
new tort of sexual harassment, because
Bhadauria tells us that sex discrimination falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of human
rights commissions. (2005, 647, 663)
The courts have recognized a tort of sexual harass-
ment by other names, recognizing that sexually har-
assing conduct is tortious. But court recognition of
the explicit tort remains weak. The established torts
of battery, sexual assault, nuisance, and emotional
distress all hold elements relevant to street sexual har-
assment. As mentioned earlier in this article, sexual
harassment results in a loss of dignity, autonomy,
personhood, and personal integrity (BC Law Institute
2001 , at 1 1 ) . Additional harms flow from any of bat-
tery, assault, nuisance, or emotional distress that is
sexual or gender based “including difficulties relating
to depression, anxiety, mood disorders, disturbances
of sleep, eating, sexuality, personality, interpersonal
relationships, child development, and learning abilit-
ies” (British Columbia Law Institute 2001 , 1 1 ) . Tort
law and its awards have recognized such damages.
Sexual assault is an accepted sexual violence tort, of-
ten seen in cases of childhood sexual abuse. Even
with near-universal societal rejection of rape, Cana-
dian courts have not awarded civil remedies for sexual
assault consistently. The harm of sexual assault “has
not yet been fully recognized by the civil justice sys-
tem” (British Columbia Law Institute 2001 ) . Craig
Brown and Melanie Randall (2004) argue for an ex-
pansive, public insurance-like system:
This leads us to examine alternative ways that
the financial resources available to automobile
accident victims might also be available to be-
nefit victims of domestic and sexual violence.
This involves the reform of the criminal injur-
ies compensation system and a clear articula-
tion of a rationale for compensation. Given
that this would involve significant public ex-
penditure, and therefore political opposition,
we also consider models for a private insurance
response. Our conclusion is that the only vi-
able solution to the gross under-compensation
of those injured by acts of domestic and sexual
violence in Canada, is a substantially enhanced
public compensation scheme. (316)
If sexual assault survivors do not feel adequately
compensated by the civil justice system, there is little
hope for victims of street sexual harassment. One
problem is that there is rarely any physical evidence.
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Further, unlike a rape at a house party, where wit-
nesses may have a personal connection with the com-
plainant, there is not necessarily a personal
connection with witnesses on a public street corner.
Legal remedies in civil suits are aimed to put the
Plaintiff in the situation they would have been in but
for the wrong done to them. Courts have struggled to
adequately award damages to sexual assault survivors
seeking to be put in the situation they would have
been in prior to the acute attack; street sexual harass-
ment survivors have even less reason for hope. Com-
pensable losses due to street sexual harassment too
often result from cumulative experiences and are,
therefore, too multi-causational to satisfy the tort
framework.
DB et al. v. Johnson (2012) is one Canadian civil litig-
ation case related to street sexual harassment that
proved a success. Various plaintiffs filed a claim
against their neighbour for damages arising from as-
sault, battery, and intentional infliction of mental
suffering. The behaviour included making lewd sexu-
al suggestions and comments, verbal sexual harass-
ment, inappropriate touching (such as grabbing
breasts and buttocks, sometimes in public) . The
Court commented that “[t] he whistling, catcalls and
insults by themselves, however objectionable, cannot
support a claim for damages.” Nonetheless, the Court
decided that “non-consensual touching aside, each of
the female plaintiffs, satisfied me that they had
suffered humiliation and intimidation and an appre-
hension of sexual assault.” The Court assessed dam-
ages at between $350 and $5,500 per plaintiff.
Unhelpfully, this victory was only possible because
there was an identifiable Defendant making continu-
ous and traceable assaults. It is also worth noting that
the Defendant did not defend in the action.
A British Columbia report on civil remedies in cases
of sexual assault recommends extending the bases for
liability to include negligence, vicarious liability, and
breach of non-delegable duty (British Columbia Law
Institute 2001 ) . An expanded conception of sexual
assault and its causes increases the chances of remed-
ies for survivors. It also increases potential street
sexual harassment recovery when combined with
growing class action capacity in Canada.
The basic purpose of class action law is to change the
costs and benefits in any legal situation so plaintiffs
can band together to distribute the costs of litigation
across a number of Plaintiffs who each have a right to
a remedy that would not individually be sizeable
enough to warrant a law suit. Companies that might
normally breach their duties because the harm to an
individual customer would not merit an expensive ac-
tion become justly exposed to their aggregate liability
(Canadian Bar Association: BC Branch 2017) .
Street sexual harassment class action suits could use
traditional negligence and vicarious liability law to
build class actions against the actors whose inertia fa-
cilitates street sexual harassment. Examples might in-
clude outdoor construction companies that refuse to
act against staff or contractors who sexually harass
passersby, municipalities whose inaccurate transit
schedules leave women vulnerable for long periods of
time, or bars that, instead of calling the police, eject
harassing patrons who then move to verbally harass
others in the public sphere.
Overall, private tort law has struggled to account for
women. Margot Schlanger (2002) has explored the
reasonable person standard in torts and its bias toward
what men deem reasonable. Martha Chamallas’ re-
search has determined that “the negligent infliction of
emotional harm and negligent interference with rela-
tionships are low in the hierarchy of compensable
harms, in part because of their cognitive link to wo-
men and women’s injuries” (2005, 4) .
Remedies for gender-based violence are no different.
In “Gendered Harms and the Law ofTort: Remedying
(Sexual) Harassment,” Joanne Conaghan identified
structural concerns within tort law:
It may be precisely because the law recognizes
the “wrong” inherent in defamation that it is
socially perceived; it may be because the law
denies a remedy for many of the acts which
constitute sexual harassment that it is too often
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socially denied. In other words harm is socially
constructed and legally constituted; unless a
harm is recognized as such by society and by
law, it is not experienced as such. That is why
for years many women have put up with sexual
harassment without complaint: the social and
legal failure to recognize the injury entailed has
led women simply to endure it, repressing their
feelings of violation, incipient outrage, the
sense that a wrong had been perpetrated [foot-
notes removed] . (1996, 429)
Even established gender-based harms struggle within
status quo tort law; new concepts such as street sexual
harassment face many challenges. Though Conaghan
(1996) and Brown and Randall (2004) argue for a
continued use of tort law as part of the feminist pro-
ject, this article argues it cannot be the only avenue
for upheaval, particularly where street sexual harass-
ment is concerned. The threshold for intention in any
torts—albeit on the balance of probabilities—may be
too onerous in most cases of street sexual harassment.
ii. Public Law
The criminal law also has a poor record addressing
gender-based violence. Sexual assault rates are disturb-
ingly high and convictions disturbingly low; this has
been driven by many factors related to systemic miso-
gyny in the policing and judicial establishments (Ran-
dall 2004) . The outcome for more fleeting forms of
gender violence, such as street sexual harassment, re-
mains an open question. The following portion of the
article will address specific sections of Canada’s Crim-
inal Code. There is no Code provision squarely focused
on street sexual harassment.
Section 265. Assault
The s.265 sexual assault provision of the Criminal
Image 3: This chart provides a short form ofthe key Criminal Code provisions that could be argued to be applicable to street sexual
harassment.
Atlantis Journal Issue 39.2 /2018 48
Code does not work well for street sexual harassment
because street sexual harassment involves words and
not physical touching or force, as described under
s.265.1 (a) . Under s.265.1 (b) , any act or gesture that
is reasonably perceived as a subjective threat could be
considered assault. So, although the collection of
street sexual harassment experiences in a woman’s life
may be threatening on the whole, each incident will
likely seem too benign to reach the s.265 threshold.
Highly menacing sexual harassment—even on the
street—could reach this threshold, however.
Section 264. Harassment
The s.264 criminal harassment provision is often
called the anti-stalking provision. However, much re-
search exists on the section's deep inadequacy in ad-
dressing stalking (for example, see MacFarlane 1997) .
Section 264 sets too high a threshold for use against
street sexual harassment. The Code requires “re-
peated” acts. Although women’s lived experiences of
street sexual harassment are repeated, the perpetrator
is usually different in each instance. Because the
Code historically requires that a single harasser attack
the same women repeatedly, street sexual harassers
who randomize their attacks on different women re-
ceive impunity under this current provision.
Section 173. Indecency
The public indecency sections of the Code hold po-
tential to curb street sexual harassment. Street sexual
harassment is instinctively—as the harm discussed
above provides—an indecent act. Unfortunately, des-
pite a rich body of statutory interpretation, indecency
has never been thoroughly interpreted through a
feminist lens.1 Anti-pornography issues involving de-
cency have focused on overall threats to women, but
within the community standards test. The com-
munity standards test is a judicial endorsement of
tyranny of the majority. This is demonstrated by the
Court’s recognition that public opinion surveys may
be appropriate to measure “a general average of com-
munity thinking and feeling”(R v. Labaye 2005) . The
court has focused on the “harm” issue within the
community standards test, arguing that social norms
are not determinative2 but this half-measure is insuf-
ficient.
Lise Gotell cites Jeffrey Weeks in her deconstruction
of the Butler decision. In R v. Butler, Butler, a Man-
itoba video storeowner, was convicted under the
Criminal Code obscenity law for distributing porno-
graphic videos. Butler claimed the Code violated his
constitutional right to freedom of expression. The
Court upheld the obscenity law as a justifiable restric-
tion on freedom of expression. Weeks (and then Go-
tell) wrote: “Moral panics are flurries of social anxiety,
usually focusing on a condition or person, or a group
of persons, who have become defined as a threat to
accepted social values and assumptions” (Weeks 1986,
95) . Gotell (1997) notes that the Butler factum sub-
missions embody the core problem with the com-
munity standards test:
The role of law as guardian of the moral uni-
verse is clearly defended and applauded in each
of these factums. Implicit here is the assump-
tion that the depiction of sexual practices that
lie outside of majoritarian norms constitutes a
threat to the community itself. (53)
Although some feminists interpreted Butler as a vic-
tory, the victory is steeped in a problematic legal
framework. Queer theorists such as Brenda Cossman
(2004) contend that Butler did not apply a feminist
lens to community standards. As Gotell (1997) states,
“Butler merely provide[d] a new feminist language to
legitimize and modernize what is really an old conser-
vative, moral agenda” (at 99) .
Community standards tests such as those discussed in
Butler—even those that purport to focus on harm over
norms—are antithetical to feminism. Community
standards embody normative social codes of conduct
that have oppressed women throughout Anglocentric
history. The weakness of the community standards test
is directly linked to indecency, a concept that has for
years been used to regulate women’s behaviour
through government-sponsored regulation of sexual
and artistic preferences. The decency provisions are
also steeped in gender roles: the male-dominated le-
gislature and courts are here to protect women and
children from exposure to culture that is unseemly
and “slutty.” More modern interpretations of inde-
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cency based on community standards and harm have
facially attempted to move away from embodying
majority preferences, but feminists have effectively
exposed such court claims (Cossman 1997) . I con-
tend that such decency provisions are the sword of
moral panic and a key tool in regulating women’s
sexual behaviour. To call on legal definitions of de-
cency and community standards to protect women
against street sexual harassment therefore seems
counterproductive. The Criminal Code, as the book
of rules to indicate social condemnation of beha-
viours, should focus on the harassers, not on the so-
called decency of the harassed.
I suggest that the courts and the legislature should
avoid the community standard in reviewing the de-
cency of street sexual harassment according to
s.173(1 ) and move toward a more feminist focus on
the agency of each individual woman. Leading schol-
ars in the US have similarly argued for a sexual har-
assment doctrine that employs a reasonable person
standard that accounts for complainants' intersec-
tional identities (Onwuachi-Willig 2018) .
The relevant “flashing” provision, under section
1 .75(b) of the Criminal Code, will not be considered
under the scope of this paper because “flashing” is an
obvious and recognized form of extreme street sexual
harassment. The “flashing” sections state that anyone
who (a) causes a public disturbance by shouting, us-
ing insulting language, using obscene language, or
molesting another is guilty of disorderly conduct, and
any person who (c) loiters in public and obstructs
persons who are in the same place is committing a
crime.
Either (a) or (c) could be used to criminalize street
sexual harassment. Even if the harassment is not as
obviously acute or offensive as flashing, an action that
disturbs a woman in public should be considered a
disturbance if she feels the language directed to her
was insulting, obscene, or bothersome (the traditional
definition of molestation) sufficient to satisfy ss.173-
175. Finally, any street sexual harassment that results
in a woman feeling uncomfortable while walking her
preferred public route should be considered obstruc-
tion. To make a woman uncomfortable in public is a
core kind of obstruction. Obstructing women’s free
participation in the public sphere is central to the
negative impact of street sexual harassment. In this
way, ss.173-175 are the most fitting response to street
sexual harassment.
To properly capture and condemn street sexual har-
assment, the public indecency provisions provided in
ss. 173-175 should be made more generic to encom-
pass verbal indecency, or the list of indecent acts
should be expanded beyond such physical acts as
flashing to explicitly include indecent verbal assaults.
Section 180. Nuisance
Section 180 is the last potential option to criminalize
street sexual harassment. Satisfying subsection (a) re-
quires viewing street sexual harassment as endangering
women’s health and comfort. It also requires viewing
the (predominantly female) victims as members of the
public. This should be straightforward. However, the
legal community has a history of accepting the male
viewpoint as the norm and actively asserting the male
right, under and in the law, not to know about the ex-
periences of women. Feldthusen (1990) references the
danger present when a dominant group assumes, uses,
or imposes their narrative as the neutral viewpoint:
“[M]most male law professors still refuse to consider,
let alone engage with, the issues. Instead they exercise
the male ‘right not to know’: to ignore, deny, neuter,
trivialize, and redefine gender issues in legal educa-
tion” (70-71 ) .
Envisioning a New Code Provision
As is evident from the above discussion, there is no
Code provision squarely focused on street sexual har-
assment. None of the existing laws are easily adapt-
able. Overall, the indecency and nuisance portions of
the Code seem prima facie more useful than the assault
or harassment portions.
In two recent cases, the Canadian Courts have ad-
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dressed possible use of the Code provisions to penalize
street sexual harassment. In R v. Kohl, the complain-
ant was jogging when the accused, a stranger to her,
jumped out from behind bushes and blocked her way
in a threatening and frightening manner; the accused
did not touch her or speak to her. The complainant
ran away and the accused chased her down the street.
When the complainant ran to a house to seek help,
the accused stood at the end of the driveway and
stared at her. The complainant stated that she was
very frightened. In this case, the accused was con-
victed of criminal harassment under s.264(2)(d) and
was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. He ap-
pealed the conviction and the sentence. The appeal of
the conviction was dismissed, but the sentence appeal
was allowed to reduce the sentence to two years, with
conditions. This is an extreme case of street sexual
harassment that met the threshold for criminal har-
assment as envisioned by the Code.
In R v. Burns, the perpetrator whistled at the com-
plainant and said "nice butt" or "nice ass." After the
complainant ran to get away, the Appellant called
out, "Are those pants painted on?" The Appellant was
acquitted of the conviction for harassment, with the
Court noting:
While the [perpetrator’s] conduct was clearly
inappropriate and unwanted, we do not see the
incident as amounting to threatening conduct
within the meaning of those words in
s.264(2)(d) . Although the complainant justifi-
ably felt upset and scared by the appellant's
conduct, viewed objectively, we do not see it as
rising to the level of a "tool of intimidation de-
signed to instill a sense of fear. (R v. Burns)
This Court decided that this very common example
of street sexual harassment did not warrant sanction
under the Code.
Despite inadequacies, criminal law stands as our soci-
ety's main mechanism to condemn actions. I there-
fore contend that the Canadian legislature should
enact new criminal laws against street sexual harass-
ment. Street sexual harassment provisions may not be
easy to prosecute, but neither are many provisions of
the Criminal Code regarding sexual violence. Con-
demnation under the Code is an important start to es-
tablishing the basic type of conduct that will not be
tolerated. A new provision eschews the need to re-en-
vision older provisions alongside unbiased statutory
interpretation.
The struggle to recognize sexual harassment is ampli-
fied by the law’s chosen human rights approach, which
requires the right be tied to a status; for example, that
of an employee. This caveat hinders the full protection
of dignity that women deserve in all roles and situ-
ations. The advantage of a criminal law approach to
street sexual harassment is that it codifies the breach of
attacks on dignity across the citizen experience.
i. Looking Internationally
Many jurisdictions around the world have taken ac-
tion to curb sexual harassment and provide helpful
lessons or ideas that Canada should consider. For ex-
ample, in 2010, UN Women launched targeted pro-
grams to increase women’s public safety in Ecuador,
Egypt, India, Papua New Guinea, and Rwanda
(United Nations 2010) . In 2014, the Nepal police
implemented a focused campaign to curb sexual har-
assment on public buses. Police register complaints
and file reports regarding the places and circumstances
of harassment (Stop Street Harassment 2014) . In the
District of Columbia, it is now illegal to engage in ab-
usive language or conduct that disturbs a person's
path through a public space (Badger 2014) . In March
2015, Peru passed an anti-sexual harassment law that
states that any act or threat affecting the freedom and
dignity of movement and the right to physical and
moral integrity of vulnerable peoples is harassment
and punishable (Steinkellner 2015) . Belgium and
Portugal have made it illegal to sexually harass or in-
timidate a person and violation of the law is punish-
able by a fine of up to one year in prison; Portugal has
made it three years if the victim of harassment is
younger than 14 years (King 2016) . In November of
2017, Belgium handed its first court judgment related
to street harassment. The state fined a man nearly
€3000 for harassing a female police officer (Flanders
Today 2018) .
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Many jurisdictions have taken the route of ticketing
for street sexual harassment. In partial response to the
#MeToo movement, France has passed legislation
which will target several forms of sexual harassment,
including street harassment. The new law will ban
“insulting, intimidating, threatening and following
women in public spaces,” any of which can lead to a
fine of up to €750. France’s junior minister for
gender equality, Marlène Schiappa, stated, “Harass-
ment in the street has previously not been punished.
From now on, it will . . . forbid insulting, intimidat-
ing, threatening and following women in public
spaces" (Politico 2017; Harper’s 2018.)
There are some significant drawbacks, however, to a
ticket-based regime, including the potential for bias
in implementation and the potential for dispropor-
tionately targeting marginalized groups (White
2018) . Further, a ticketing system may undermine
any message the state intends to make about the seri-
ousness of street sexual harassment. Compared to the
more common breaches that result in tickets—speed-
ing, parking incorrectly, riding a bicycle without a
helmet—tickets send no strong message about soci-
ety’s unwillingness to accept a particular behaviour.
ii. RecentCanadian Developments
In March 2017, the Standing Committee on the
Status of Women conducted a study on violence
against young women and girls in Canada and
presented their findings and recommendations to par-
liament (House of Commons 2017) . The committee
provided 45 recommendations to help prevent gender-
based violence. A few recommendations recognized
the lack of research on street harassment and called for
the Government of Canada to fund initiatives, in-
cluding new research and analysis of existing research
that addresses intersectional violence, street harass-
ment, and sexual harassment in public spaces and its
effects on women (House ofCommons 2017) .
The Government of Canada proposed Bill C-309, An
Act to Establish Gender Equality Week, to recognize
certain hardships faced by women. The Act proclaims
the last week of September each year in Canada as
“Gender Equality Week.” The Bill received Royal As-
Image 4. This graphic shows some ofthe activist work being done to bring street sexual harassment to the fore. (Hui 2015;
Brown 2014; Killermann 2014; Magwood2014; Romano 2014;White 2014; Jurecko 2016; Crosby 2017; Gillis 2018).
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sent on June 21 , 2018, and September 2018 saw the
first Gender Equality Week. The notable feature
about this Act is that 2016 debates on the issue re-
flect recognition of “[c] atcalling, harassment on the
street, slut shaming, [and] victim blaming” as com-
monplace, and that “[w] e need to raise the bar on
those” (House of Commons Debates 2016) . Yet, not-
ably, the Act itself does not explicitly recognize street
harassment.
Kiera Liblik has noted that Canada has ratified the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW), a UN docu-
ment focused on eliminating sex-based
discrimination, and has suggested that failing to
criminalize street harassment would be against the in-
terests ofCEDAW (Liblik 2015) .
Conclusions
Many women’s organizations, including Women in
Cities International and Hollaback!, are helping to
share personal stories and raise consciousness about
street sexual harassment. Street sexual harassment is
an affront to human dignity and the right to parti-
cipate freely in the public sphere, a basic civil liberty.
Street sexual harassment—and the lack of legal re-
sponse to it—is therefore an ongoing denial of basic
rights. The shift in awareness and recognition of
workplace sexual harassment provides some hope for
similar change regarding street sexual harassment.
However, judicial systems still struggle to bring
justice to women survivors of workplace harassment.
No current Canadian law may be sufficient to address
street sexual harassment, due to historical bias in
construction and application of the law. New crimin-
al laws are therefore required. Other jurisdictions are
enacting stronger anti-street harassment provisions
than Canada. It is time for our legislators to lead on
women’s right to dignity in public.
Endnotes
1 . The Butler decision is one of the better-known in-
decency decisions. This article will refer to Butler be-
cause it engages core questions around indecency.
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Min-
ister of Justice) [2000] 2 SCR 1120 is an equally rel-
evant and concerning decision.
2. Craig (2009) states: “Chief Justice McLachlin de-
termined in Labaye that the type of harm identified in
Butler (that being ‘conduct which society formally re-
cognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning’)
must be assessed not by community standards of tol-
erance, but rather by those norms which our society
has formally recognized in the constitution or similar
fundamental laws: ‘The inquiry is not based on indi-
vidual notions of harm, nor on the teachings of a par-
ticular ideology, but on what society, through its
fundamental laws, has recognized as essential. Views
about the harm that the sexual conduct at issue may
produce, however widely held, do not suffice to
ground a conviction. This is not to say that social values
no longer have a role to play. ’” [footnotes removed]
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